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Temporal Severance and the Exclusion
of Time in Determining the Economic
Value of Regulated Property
By CARLA BoYD*
THE RIGHT TO OWN property and do with it as one chooses is a
cherished right of every United States citizen. At the same time, this
individual liberty must be tempered with protection of the environ-
ment and society as a whole. The law of regulatory takings sits in the
balance of these often conflicting purposes. This Comment focuses on
one specific area of regulatory takings jurisprudence-conceptual sev-
erance in general and temporal severance in particular. A regulatory
taking occurs when the government regulates in such a way that it
unduly interferes with the bundle of rights associated with a land-
owner's property.' A regulatory taking requires compensation when it
goes "too far."2 A critical question in determining whether this has
occurred is what portion of the landowner's property is considered.3
Should the courts consider the regulation's impact on the entire par-
cel of land or only the land directly affected by the regulation? The
latter approach, known as "conceptual severance," severs the portions
of land affected by the regulation from the unaffected portions.4
The related approach of "temporal severance" involves a tempo-
rary rather than permanent regulation.5 In determining whether a
regulation has gone "too far" in this instance, it is necessary to ask
whether the courts should examine the impact of the regulation on
* Class of 2003. The author would like to thank her grandparents Herb and Widgie
Hastings for their unconditional love and support, and Professor Alice Kaswan for her
valuable assistance in the development of this Comment. This Comment is dedicated to
the loving memory of the author's mother, Gerry LoPresti Boyd.
1. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
2. Id.
3. See ROBERT MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND
USE CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 144 (1999) (laying the foundational the-
ory of takings law).
4. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Praperty: Cross Currents in the Juris-
prudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1676 (1988).
5. See MELTZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 150.
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the property over a span of time, including before and after the regu-
lation was in effect, or only the period of time that the regulation was
in effect. 6 To provide a simple illustration, assume that Zachary owns a
piece of property.7 Assume further that the local government passes a
land use regulation that completely bars all development and use of
certain types of land. Also suppose that this land use regulation com-
pletely eliminates the value of the land to which it applies, and that it
affects two-thirds of Zachary's property.
In Figure 1, conceptual severance is not used. The court would
determine whether the regulation went "too far" by considering the
impact of the regulation on the entire parcel. The court would con-
clude that the value of the parcel had been reduced by 66.6%, since
that is the portion affected by the land use regulation. This leaves
33.3% of Zachary's property unaffected.
No Conceptual SeveranceI 2/3 of Zachary's property is
regulated.
i : , ,iiiii~i :i , , When looking at the property as a
whole 66.6% is regulated.
] Regulated Property This results in only a partial taking,F1 which may or may not be considered
Eu a compensable taking.
Property Considered
Figure 1
In Figure 2, on the other hand, if conceptual severance is used,
the court would only look at the section affected by the regulation.
Since two out of two sections were rendered unusable and valueless,
the court would conclude that Zachary had lost 100% of the value of
his property.
As illustrated by Figures 1 and 2, the court is much more likely to
find that a regulation has gone "too far" if it conceptually severs the
property and only considers the portion of property affected by the
regulation. If conceptual severance is not used, then only 66.6% of
6. See id.
7. These examples are an extreme oversimplication of takings analysis; the author
only hopes to illustrate the basic concepts.
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Conceptual Severance
Only the 66.6% that is regulated isH' considered.
Two out of two portions are entirely
affected by the regulation.
Regulated Property The entire property is taken, which is
more likely to result in a
U. compensable taking than in Figure 1.
Property Considered
Figure 2
Zachary's property is affected; if conceptual severance is used, then
100% of Zachary's property is affected.
To illustrate the concept of temporal severance, further assume
Zachary purchased the property in 1998 and the regulation was in
effect for the entire year of 1999. For the purposes of this example,
assume the regulation affects Zachary's entire piece of property (in-
stead of two-thirds, as in the previous illustrations).
Zachary brings suit in 2002. Assuming that a statute of limitations
does not bar his claim, the court has the option of looking at either
(1) the period between 1998 and 2002 (the entire time Zachary owns
the property); or (2) the year of 1999 (the year the regulation was in
effect).
Figure 3 illustrates the first option by considering the entire pe-
riod of time that Zachary owns the property. In this example, it is less
likely that a taking exists because only one out of the four years was
impacted by the regulation.
Figure 4 illustrates the second option, the use of temporal sever-
ance. Under this analysis, the court would only look at the one year
period between 1999 and 2000 that the regulation impacted the prop-
erty. Since Zachary completely lost the use of his property in that one
year, he would argue that the reduction in value of the property was
100%. Like the conceptual severance example in Figure 2, it is much
more likely that a taking will be found when temporal severance is
used in this simplistic illustration.
This Comment addresses the issue of whether temporal severance
should be used to determine the existence of a taking. In so doing,
this Comment examines whether the property owner has been de-
prived of all economically beneficial or productive use of her land.
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INo Temporal Severance I
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Time Period Regulation is in Place
Time Period Considered
Zachary purchases a piece of property in 1998.
In 1999 the local planning agency adopts
temporary legislation that prohibits any
development on certain land until 2000.
Zachary's entire piece of property is affected.
In order to determine the existence of a taking,
the court looks at the entire period of time that
Zachary owns the property (1998-2002 when
suit is brought).
Therefore, there has been a 25% decrease in the
value of Zachary's property.
Part I gives a brief background of constitutional takings law, describes
regulatory takings generally, and introduces the issue of conceptual
severance. Part I concludes by discussing conceptual and temporal
Temporal Severance
Zachary purchases a piece of property in
1998. In 1999 the local planning agencyS17adopts temporary legislation that prohibits
any development on certain land until 2000.
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
D Time Period Regulation is in Place
E Time Period Considered
Zachary's entire piece of property is affected.
In order to determine the existence of a
taking, the court looks at the finite period of
time that prohibition was in place-the year
of 1999.
Therefore, there has been a 100% decrease in
the value of Zachary's property.
In this illustration, it is much more likely that
the court would find a compensable taking,
Figure 4
severance in the context of measuring the relevant parcel to deter-
mine whether there has been a taking.
Part II addresses the problem of whether the United States Su-
preme Court should allow temporal severance for purposes of deter-
mining whether there has been a total taking. It analyzes the Ninth
Figure 3
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Circuit's decision in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Re-
gional Planning Agency8 (" TSPC f"), as well as both the majority opinion
and the opinion dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc.9
This Part also introduces First English Evangelical Church of Glendale v.
Los Angeles10 ("First English") and addresses the potential conflict be-
tween TSPC I and First English. Finally, Part II briefly addresses the
Federal Circuit's treatment of conceptual severance.
Part III examines conceptual severance and the applicability of
First English. It suggests that there are three possible interpretations of
First English, and argues that First English did not explicitly or implicitly
endorse temporal severance.
Part IV of this Comment suggests that the Supreme Court should
use its hearing of TSPC as an opportunity to clarify conceptual sever-
ance. This Part examines the feasibility of temporal severance in light
of the fact that the future economic value of land is intertwined with
the present value of land at any given time.
In Part V, this Comment concludes that looking at the value of
land in a vacuum is impossible and proposes that the Supreme Court
reject the use of temporal severance in regulatory takings analysis.
I. Background: The Takings Clause
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states,
"private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation."11 This provision was subsequently applied to the states via
the Fourteenth Amendment, signifying the first time the Federal Con-
stitution was implemented at the state level. 12 It was, however, tradi-
tionally limited to a physical taking of property. 13 The requirement
that the property be physically taken was short lived, and in 1922, tak-
ings jurisprudence entered the realm of regulations.14 Put simply,
there are two kinds of takings: (1) possessory takings that essentially
8. 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2589 (U.S. June 29, 2001)
(No. 00-1167) [hereinafter TSPC I].
9. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 228 F.3d 998
(9th Cir. 2000), reh'g en banc denied [hereinafter TSPC II].
10. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1897) (rul-
ing that the taking of private property for public use by the state without compensation is a
violation of due process).
13. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (limiting takings to the govern-
ment expropriating property or physically occupying it).
14. See generally Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (holding that if a property
regulation goes "too far," it will be considered a taking).
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take the property from its owner; and (2) regulatory takings where the
regulation has such a significant impact on the property that a taking
has occurred. 15
There are two questions to be answered in the takings claim: (1)
is there a taking? and (2) has just compensation been paid?16 Both of
these questions should be considered independently. This Comment
deals primarily with the first question, which establishes the threshold
issue of whether there has been a taking. 17
The government has the right to take private property for public
use through the theory of eminent domain.18 It is defined as "[t]he
inherent power of a government entity to take privately owned prop-
erty, [especially] land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasona-
ble compensation for the taking."19 This power is not explicit in the
Constitution, but is implied from the Takings Clause itself: "The
Court has also noted that the [F]ifth [A]mendment's limitation on
taking private property is a tacit recognition that the power to take
private property exists." 20
A. Regulatory Takings
In 1922, the United States Supreme Court extended takings law
to regulatory takings in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.21 There, the
Court established the general rule that "while property may be regu-
lated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking."22 At issue in Mahon was an act prohibiting the mining of
coal if it would damage the structural support of "human habita-
tions."23 The statute exempted property where the surface was owned
by the owners of the underlying coal. 24 The defendant coal company
had executed a deed to the plaintiff homeowners, stating that the coal
company reserved the right to mine the coal beneath the homeown-
ers' property. 25 This deed released the coal company from any liability
15. See MELTZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 3.
16. See id. at 4.
17. See generally id. for a more in-depth analysis of the Takings Clause.
18. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 541 (7th ed. 1999).
19. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 541 (7th ed. 1999).
20. JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.11, at 425 (4th
ed. 1991).
21. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
22. Id. at 415.
23. Id. at 412-13.
24. See id. at 413.
25. See id. at 412.
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arising from the mining of coal beneath this property.26 The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held that the act in question superseded the
contract between the surface owners and the coal company because
the statute was a proper exercise of police power.27 The United States
Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding "that the act cannot be
sustained as an exercise of the police power, so far as it affects the
mining of coal under streets or cities in places where the right to mine
such coal has been reserved." 28
The Mahon opinion articulated one of the central conflicts in reg-
ulatory takings jurisprudence: "Government hardly could go on if to
some extent values incident to property could not be diminished with-
out paying for every such change in the general law."29 However, in
support of this extension of takings law to the regulation of property,
Justice Holmes commented on the concern by stating that "a strong
public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to war-
rant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way
of paying for the change."30 Justice Holmes questioned where and on
whom the loss resulting from the desired change should fall.31 Em-
phasizing that a balance must be struck, it was necessary to determine
when a regulation goes "too far."3 2 The Court stated that "[o]ne fact
for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the dimi-
nution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases
there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to
sustain the act."33 Referred to as the "diminution of value test," this
analysis focuses on the "impact of the regulation on the private value of
the property as the decisive factor for compensation."3 4 Ultimately the
question of whether a regulation has gone "too far" depends on the
particular facts of the case.35
Additional cases were decided determining that not all regulation
of property will result in a compensable taking. 36 Reduction in the
value of property is sometimes viewed as the expected incidents of
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. Id. at 414.
29. Id at 413.
30. Id, at 416.
31. See id
32. Id at 415.
33. Id. at 413.
34. THOMASJ. MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAw 146 (Oxford University Press 1997).
35. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
36. See, e.g., Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 286 (1939) (holding that legisla-
tion approving the use of property owned by the petitioner to divert floods was not a tak-
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ownership and therefore not a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 37
This leaves open the question of what kind of regulation should be
considered a taking not incident to ownership.
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,38 the United
States Supreme Court explained the general rules of takings jurispru-
dence.39 In that case, the New York City Land Preservation Commis-
sion failed to approve plans for construction of a fifty story office
building above the Grand Central Station terminal. 40 Since Grand
Central Station had been designated a landmark, the owners had to
obtain permission from the Land Preservation Commission before the
owner could "alter the exterior architectural features of the landmark
or construct any exterior improvement on the landmark site." 41 The
Court admitted that determining whether a regulation constituted a
taking depended largely on "ad hoc, factual inquiries."42 In these fac-
tual inquiries, the Court found a common thread between three bal-
ancing factors: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
investment backed expectations; and (3) the character of the govern-
mental action. 43 Ultimately, the Court held that a compensable taking
had not taken place. 44
The Court reasoned that the regulation designating the parcel as
a landmark site was "substantially related to the promotion of the gen-
eral welfare" 45 and still afforded the landowners the ability to develop
the airspace in a limited manner. 46 In determining whether to evalu-
ate the entire parcel or just the airspace the appellants were unable to
develop, the Court specifically stated that "' [t] aking' jurisprudence
does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to
determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated. '47 Instead, courts are to focus on the "parcel as a whole. '48
ing); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 259 (1980) (holding that city's open space land
zoning ordinance did not constitute a compensable taking).
37. See Danforth, 308 U.S. at 285; Agins, 447 U.S. at 262-63.
38. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
39. See id. at 123-24.
40. See id. at 115-17.
41. Id. at 112.
42. Id. at 124.
43. See id. See also MELTZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 130-43 (providing an analysis of the
three factors).
44. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138.
45. Id. at 138.
46. See generally id. (citing to cases in which landowners' property rights were limited
as a result of zoning laws which promoted the general welfare).
47. Id. at 130.
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In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,49 the United States Su-
preme Court summarized two categorical takings50 where the case by
case inquiry articulated in Penn Central would not be necessary.5 1 At
issue in Lucas was a South Carolina regulation that prohibited Lucas
from developing two lots of beachfront property.52 The South Caro-
lina Supreme Court held that the act in question did not require com-
pensation under the takings clause because the regulation was for the
public good. 53 The United States Supreme Court, however, rejected
this standard.5 4 Instead, the Court summarized the two categorical
rules of takings jurisprudence 55 and remanded the case to the South
Carolina Supreme Court.5 6
The first category the Court discussed relates to physical takings
and is described as "encompass [ing] regulations that compel the
property owner to suffer a physical 'invasion' of his property. '5 7 The
second categorical approach "is where regulation denies all economi-
cally beneficial or productive use of land."58 If a plaintiff bringing a
regulatory takings claim argues either of these two categorical excep-
tions, then the Penn Central balancing test is not required.59 If, how-
ever, there is not a categorical total taking, then a plaintiff must use
the factors in Penn Central to establish a regulatory taking.60 The bal-
ancing factors are to be employed for a partial, rather than total,
taking.61
This Comment focuses only on the second categorical exception,
whereby the "regulation denies all economically beneficial or produc-
tive use of land."62 The Supreme Court indicated that the determina-
48. Id. at 131.
49. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
50. Categorical takings involve a more focused inquiry into a specific test, whereas a
balancing approach weighs various factors. A categorical approach is more straightforward
to apply, while the case by case inquiry is more flexible, allowing factors to have different
weight depending on the circumstances and other factors present.
51. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
52. See id. at 1008.
53. See id. at 1009-10.
54. See id. at 1028.
55. See id. at 1015-16.
56. See id. at 1032.
57. Id. at 1015.
58. Id (emphasis added).
59. See id.
60. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).
61. See id. See also Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224-26
(1986).
62. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
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tion on remand of whether Lucas had been denied all economically
beneficial use of his land depended on the state's laws regarding the
"essential use '6 3 of the land.64 More importantly, the Court stated the
rule that "[w]hen... a regulation that declares 'off-limits' all econom-
ically productive or beneficial uses of land goes beyond what the rele-
vant background principles would dictate, compensation must be paid
to sustain it."65
B. Ascertaining the Relevant Parcel
No matter what test or inquiry is used, in order to determine
whether a regulatory taking has occurred, a court must determine the
relevant property. 66 The relevant property is crucial to the inquiry be-
cause the claim is that the government has taken the landowner's
property without just compensation. However, as in the examples
given at the beginning of this Comment, sometimes the regulation
only affects portions of the property or only affects the property for a
finite period of time. The question thus becomes whether the court
should look at the entire piece of property and inquire whether the
landowner has been deprived of all economically beneficial or pro-
ductive use of that property as a whole, or, in the alternative, whether
the court should only look at the property affected by the regulation.
The latter option is conceptual severance.
1. Conceptual Severance
This determination is complicated and can involve a quasi-mathe-
matical comparison of "the value that has been taken from the prop-
erty with the value that remains in the property."67 Thus, the critical
issue in determining whether a taking of the property has occurred is
defining what constitutes the particular property.68 In other words,
how is the "relevant parcel" defined?69
63. Essential use seems to be the Court's recognition that certain activities are essen-
tial to a landowner's use of her property. See id. at 1031 (citing Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S.
78, 86 (1911) (referring to a landowner's right to pasture cattle on his land and have access
to his land as essential uses)).
64. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031-32 (emphasizing that this analysis has to do with nui-
sance law).
65. Id. at 1030.
66. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 496-97 (1987);
TSPCI, 216 F.3d 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2589 (U.S.June 29, 2001)
(No. 00-1167).
67. TSPC 1, 216 F.3d at 774 (quoting Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497).
68. See id.
69. See MELTZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 144-54. See also TSPC I, 216 F.3d at 774.
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Conceptual severance:
[C]onsists of delineating a property interest consisting ofjust what
the government action has removed from the owner, and then as-
serting that that particular whole thing has been permanently
taken. Thus, this strategy hypothetically or conceptually "severs"
from the whole bundle of rights just those strands that are inter-
fered with by the regulation, and then hypothetically or concep-
tually construes those strands in the aggregate as a separate whole
thing.70
Conceptual severance involves many dimensions, including "depth,
width, and length." 71 Depth refers to "the extent to which the owner
may not use the property in question. '72 Width refers to the "amount
of property encompassed by the restrictions. ' 73 Length describes the
duration that the regulation will affect the given property.74 This final
type of conceptual severance is referred to as "temporal severance. '75
Defining the property in a regulatory takings analysis is an impor-
tant and contentious undertaking. Whether the United States Su-
preme Court eventually allows conceptual severance of the property
in question is extremely influential in determining whether there has
been a total taking. If it is allowed, then a court is much more likely to
find a total taking than if it looks at the property as a whole. As the
example given at the beginning of this Comment illustrates, if the en-
tire piece of property is evaluated in the takings analysis, then the
property still retains much of its value. On the other hand, if the eval-
uation is narrowed to the piece of property that is regulated, then that
entire piece is affected and may have a much lower economic value.
The direction the current Supreme Court will take regarding its
willingness to separate the property is not entirely clear. However, in
Penn Central, the Court clearly rejected the idea of conceptual sever-
ance when it stated:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
70. Radin, supra note 4, at 1676.
71. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 303,
330 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. See, e.g., TSPC 1, 216 F.3d 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2589
(U.S. June 29, 2001) (No. 00-1167) (describing the plaintiffs' argument in favor of tempo-
ral severance such that the court "should conceptually sever each plaintiffs fee interest
into discrete segments in at least one of these dimensions-the temporal one-and treat
each of those segments as separate and distinct property interests for purposes of takings
analysis.").
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segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a par-
ticular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court fo-
cuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature
and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a
whole. 76
In Penn Central, the conflict involved only the airspace affected by
the landmark designation. However, the Court still considered the rel-
evant parcel to be both the terminal and the airspace above it.77 Cen-
tral to the Court's reasoning was the fact that the owners still retained
an economic benefit regardless of the landmark designation and were
not deprived of all use of their property by the regulation. 78
The Supreme Court's rejection of conceptual severance was clear
until Justice Scalia stated in a footnote of the majority opinion in Lu-
cas that "[r]egrettably, the rhetorical force of our 'deprivation of all
economically feasible use' rule is greater than its precision, since the
rule does not make clear the 'property interest' against which the loss
of value is to be measured. '79 By pointing out, or perhaps creating,
this ambiguity regarding the relevant parcel in the equation, Justice
Scalia indicates a possible impetus to clear up the ambiguity in a fu-
ture case. In addition, the Supreme Court case of Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island0 points out the conflicting views on this topic.81 In that case,
the Court cited Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis for the
rule against conceptual severance, and then Justice Scalia's footnote
as "express[ing] discomfort with the logic of' this rule.s 9 Although
raised by the petitioner in Palazzolo, the Court chose not to address
the relevant parcel conundrum because the petitioner failed to raise
the argument in the lower courts.8 3
2. Temporal Severance
Temporally severing a property interest requires looking at
whether a regulation constituted a total taking of property in terms of
a certain period of time.84 Property has various interests associated
76. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978). In addi-
tion, in 1987 the Supreme Court rejected an argument in favor of conceptual severance,
citing Penn Central See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497
(1987).
77. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130-31.
78. See id. at 134-35, 137-38.
79. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
80. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
81. See id. at 616.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. See generally MELTZ ET AI., supra note 3, at 150.
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with it; temporal severance recognizes the interest of time and sepa-
rates it from the other interests. Instead of looking at the effect the
regulation had from the time it went into effect until the time it
ceased or the time of the litigation, temporal severance looks at a cer-
tain amount of time when the regulation was in effect. The Ninth Cir-
cuit describes the temporal dimension as "the duration of the
property interest."85
This affects the finding of a total taking because the property may
no longer be regulated at the time of litigation or at a future time. As
in the example given at the beginning of this Comment, if a court
looks at the entire length of the property as a whole, then it may not
find a total taking because there might be time before and after where
the regulation has no affect. However, if the court looks only at the
time period that the regulation was in effect, then it is more likely to
find a regulatory taking.
While conceptual severance in terms of depth and width makes
theoretical sense because it is at least possible to evaluate the value of
pieces of property separately from each other, temporal severance in
terms of time does not make sense. It is impossible to take time out of
the evaluation of the value of property. In order to determine the
present economic value of property, the future value is an essential
element.86
H. Temporal Severance for Purposes of Determining
Whether There Has Been a Total Taking
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether tempo-
ral severance may be used to determine whether a taking has oc-
curred. Thus, there has been considerable discourse regarding
whether the Court implicitly condoned temporal severance in First En-
glish.87 In TSPC I, the Ninth Circuit clearly rejected temporal sever-
85. TSPC I, 216 F.3d 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2000).
86. See generally William W. Wade, Penn Central's Economic Failings Confounded Takings
Jurisprudence, 31 URB. LAw. 277 (1999) (discussing the various methods of determining the
present economic value of land in relation to takings jurisprudence).
87. See generally Steven J. Eagle, Development Moratoria, First English Principles, and Regu-
latory Takings, 31 ENVrL. L. REP. 11232 (2001) (arguing that TSPC I misapplied First En-
glish); Steven J. Eagle, Just Compensation for Permanent Takings of Temporal Interests, 10 FED.
CIR. B.J. 485 (2001) (arguing that compensation must be provided for a temporary devel-
opment moratorium); Steven J. Eagle, Temporary Regulatory Takings and Development Morato-
ria: The Murky View From Lake Tahoe, 31 ENvrL. L. REP. 10224 (2001) (disagreeing with TSPC
I's interpretation of First English); Tedra Fox, Note, Lake Tahoe's Temporary Development Mora-
torium: Why a Stitch in Time Should Not Define the Property Interest in a Takings Claim, 28 EcoL-
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ance. 88 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Kozinski argued that by
rejecting temporal severance and holding that a temporary develop-
ment moratorium is not a taking,89 the Ninth Circuit failed to follow
the authority of First English.9 Additional Federal Circuit cases may
also shed light on the question of whether to allow temporal
severance.
A. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency91
1. Temporary Development Moratoria
Temporary development moratoria are tools used for growth
management. 92 The rate, amount, type, location, and/or quality of
future development are monitored and controlled by growth manage-
ment.93 A development moratorium puts "an authorized delay in the
provision of... development approval."9 4 Growth management tools
benefit communities by promoting goals such as "protecting and en-
hancing aesthetic resources, protecting historic and cultural re-
sources, preserving farmland and open space, protecting the natural
environment (by reducing air pollution; preventing groundwater con-
tamination; and protecting sensitive habitats such as wetlands, coastal
beaches, and dunes), and providing affordable housing. 95
2. Parties and Facts
The plaintiffs in TSPC consisted of 450 people who owned prop-
erty in the Lake Tahoe Basin. 96 Each plaintiff alleged that various ac-
tions taken by the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency in the 1980s
constituted compensable takings under the Fifth Amendment to the
oGV L.Q 399 (2001) (supporting the majority opinion in TSPC land finding it consistent
with First English).
88. See TSPC 1, 216 F.3d at 774-77.
89. See TSPC II, 228 F.3d 998, 999 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
90. See id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
91. See TSPC , 216 F.3d 764; TSPCII, 228 F.3d 998; Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 121 S. Ct. 2589 (2001) [hereinafter TSPC III].
92. See MELTZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 264.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 266.
95. Id. at 265.
96. See TSPC 1, 216 F.3d at 766.
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United States Constitution. 97 The Ninth Circuit split the plaintiffs into
groups according to time periods and land classifications.9"
The facts of TSPC are complicated and involve several ordi-
nances, resolutions, regional land use plans, compacts, seven land
classifications, an injunction, and four time periods.99 Lake Tahoe
"has been undergoing 'eutrophication,' a process by which the nutri-
ent loading in the lake increases dramatically, due to nitrogen and
phosphorus (contained in soil) being washed into the lake."10 0 This
process results in excessive algae in the lake, causing a loss of clarity as
the lake becomes "green and opaque."1° 1 The rapid development of
environmentally sensitive land has caused this process of eutrophica-
tion.10 2 As a response, in 1969, the United States Congress approved
the bi-state Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, which created the
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.10 3 The agency adopted Ordinance
No. 4, which created eight different classifications of land, depending
on each classification's environmental sensitivity.'0 4 For each classifi-
cation, Ordinance No. 4 recommended what development each classi-
fication of property could reasonably sustain.105 In 1980, an
amendment to the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact refocused the
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency because of dissatisfaction with its
regulatory scheme and evidence that it was not strong enough to ade-
quately remedy the problems the Lake Tahoe Basin faced. 10 6 The
amendment ordered the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency to make
several changes in its way of dealing with the environmental damage
inflicted on Lake Tahoe. 0 7
97. See id. at 768-69.
98. See id. at 769. The land at issue in TSPC was divided into seven land classifications
based upon the level of the land's "susceptibility to environmental damage." Id. at 767. For
purposes of litigation, the plaintiffs were then divided into two groups based upon their
land classification. See id. at 769. They were then further divided into four time periods. See
id.
99. See id. 766-71.
100. Id, at 766.
101. Id. at 767.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id
107. See id. The Tahoe Regional Planning Compact amendment in 1980 directed
TRPA:
(1) to adopt "environmental threshold carrying capacities" within eighteen
months of the date on which the Compact became effective; [ ] (2) to adopt a new
regional plan within twelve months of the adoption of the carrying capacities; and
Spring 2002] CONCEPTUAL SEVERANCE
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
The agency enacted Ordinance 81-5 in 1981, which created a de-
velopment moratorium on the classified land.108 The ordinance in-
cluded some exceptions whereby the agency could approve
construction on specific portions of land.10 9 The Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency subsequently enacted a regional land use plan,
which was contested on the ground that it did not sufficiently protect
Lake Tahoe. 110 The United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of California responded to the suit by issuing a temporary re-
straining order prohibiting the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
from approving any development on the relevant land, and this order
was upheld on appeal.111 This injunction was in force until another
regional land use plan was enacted in 1987.112 The only claims that
will be discussed in this Comment are those that involve the tempo-
rary development moratorium during the two earliest time periods113
before the Regional Land Use Plan was adopted in 1987.114 The 1987
land use plan was still in effect at the time the TSPC I opinion was
written. 115
3. The Majority Opinion
In TSPC I, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected the plaintiffs argument that the court should concep-
tually sever the property interests at issue in the case.11 6 In respect to
(3) to review all projects and establish temporary restrictions on development in
the basin pending the enactment of a new regional plan.
Id. at 767-68 (citation omitted).
108. See id. at 768.
109. See id.
110. Challenges were brought by the State of California and the League to Save Lake
Tahoe. See id.
111. See California ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 766 F.2d 1308,
1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1985). See also TSPC I, 216 F.3d at 768.
112. See TSPC, 216 F.3d at 768.
113. This temporary development moratorium consisted of Ordinance 81-5, in effect
from August 24, 1981, to August 26, 1983 (Period I), and Resolution 83-21, in effect from
August 27, 1983 through April 25, 1984 (Period II). See id. at 769.
114. This is the claim relevant to this Comment because it deals with the issue on
which the Court has granted certiorari, whereas the other two claims in TSPC I deal with
(1) whether TRPA is responsible for the injunction issued in 1984; and (2) whether the
plaintiff's claims regarding the final regional land use plan of 1987 are time-barred. The
Ninth Circuit resolved both claims, holding that (1) TRPA was not responsible for the
injunction issued by the court in 1987 and thus that injunction does not spark a taking
inquiry; and (2) the plaintiff's claims regarding the final regional land use plan of 1987 are
time-barred. See id. at 785, 789.
115. See id. at 769.
116. See id. at 779.
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the time periods relevant to this Comment, the court framed the issue
in terms of the Lucas categorical taking:11 7 "[T]he only question
before us is whether the rule set forth in Lucas applies-that is,
whether a categorical taking occurred because Ordinance 81-5 and
Resolution 83-21 denied the plaintiffs 'all economically beneficial or
productive use of land. ' 1 18 The court explained that the plaintiffs
limited the questions on appeal by not arguing a takings claim under
Penn Central's ad hoc balancing test.119 Additionally, the inquiry was
limited to a facial takings claim, whereby the court only looks to the
"mere enactment of the [regulation]" and not its application to the
particular plaintiff.120
The plaintiffs argued that the court should temporally sever the
property when determining what the relevant parcel is.
The plaintiffs contend that, for purposes of determining whether
the regulations constitute a categorical taking under Lucas, we
should not treat the plaintiffs' properties as the fee interests that
they are. Instead, they argue, we should define narrowly, as a sepa-
rate property interest, the temporal "slice" of each fee that covers
the time span during which Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21
were in effect. It is this carved-out piece of each plaintiff's property
interest, the plaintiffs assert, that has been "taken" by the
regulations.121
Had the court chosen to follow this line of reasoning, it might
have found a total loss. However, it rejected the plaintiffs' proposal to
conceptually sever the property interests: "In short, we reject the
plaintiffs' contentions that First English applies to temporary moratoria
and that it works a radical change to takings law by requiring that
property interests be carved up into finite temporal segments."1 22 The
court held "[t]he relevant property interests in the present case are
the whole parcels of property that the plaintiffs own."123 It reasoned
that modern case law has rejected conceptual severance unless the
takings claim was one of "physical invasion or occupation."124 The
opinion cited cases from the United States Supreme Court,125 as well
117. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
118. TSPC I, 216 F.3d at 773 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015).
119. See id- See also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
120. TSPC I, 216 F.3d at 773 (alteration in original) (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
121. I& at 774.
122. Id. at 778.
123. Id. at 779.
124. Id. at 774.
125. See id, at 774-79 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
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as the Ninth Circuit case of MacLeod v. County of Santa Clara,126 to
support its rejection of conceptual severance.1 27
In addition, the court gave three policy reasons why it would be
detrimental to the government's ability to use temporary development
moratoria as an effective land use planning tool. 128 The court found
that temporary moratoria ensure that a community's problems will
not be compounded while the local planning agencies develop a regu-
latory scheme. 129 Second, these moratoria stop developers and land-
owners from developing before a new plan is adopted.' 30 Third,
temporary development moratoria allow a thorough evaluation of is-
sues brought up by the community and landowners, who are ulti-
mately the ones affected by the new plans.131
4. TSPC H and First English
In the dissent from an order denying the petition for rehearing
en banc of TSPC I, Judge Kozinski vehemently argued that the Ninth
Circuit's panel decision was wrong because it sought to reverse the
Supreme Court's holding in First English.13 2 His primary argument was
that the Ninth Circuit panel decision in TSPC I adopts Justice Ste-
vens's dissent in First English instead of following the majority opin-
ion.1 33 Judge Kozinski argued that in First English, the Court held that
a temporary regulatory taking is still a compensable taking. 34 He
pointed out the Federal Circuit case of Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United
States 35 that, according to him, was similar to TSPC I, but followed his
or Justice Stevens's reasoning and interpretation of First English.136
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Andrus v. Allard, 44 U.S. 51 (1979); Agins v. Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255 (1980)).
126. 749 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting temporal severance and holding that de-
nial of a permit to harvest timber did not deprive the owner of all economic benefit when
the owner still had the right to ranch and graze cattle on his land).
127. See TSPC I, 216 F.3d at 774 (citing MacLeod, 749 F.2d at 547).
128. See TSPC I, 216 F.3d at 777.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See TSPC II, 228 F.3d 998, 999 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
133. See id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
134. See id. at 1000 (KozinskiJ., dissenting).
135. 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
136. See TSPC II, 228 F.3d at 1001 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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a. First English
In order to effectively evaluate Judge Kozinski's dissent, it is nec-
essary to first analyze First English. In First English, the appellant, First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church, argued that a temporary regu-
lation prohibiting construction on its land in response to flooding of
the canyon where the land was located constituted a regulatory taking
for which the government must compensate. 137 The lower court de-
cided part of the case based on the remedy for a taking, which led the
Supreme Court to point out that "[t]he disposition of the case on
these grounds isolates the remedial question for our considera-
tion."1 38 The Court held that once the government's actions are con-
sidered a taking, the government must compensate the property
owner, even if the regulation is no longer in place. 139 The Court was
careful, however, to limit its opinion to the facts of the case. 140 The
issue of whether First English Evangelical Church had been denied all
economically beneficial value or use of its land, and consequently
whether a total taking had occurred, was remanded to the lower
court. 14 1 Therefore, the only issue decided in First English was that if a
total taking had taken place, it was irrelevant whether that total taking
was temporary.1 42 Additionally, the Court was careful to point out that
it was not deciding whether situations of "normal delays in obtaining
building permits, changes in zoning ordinance, variances, and the
like" constituted takings. 143 The Court cautiously limited its opinion
to the facts of the case, stressing that the temporary nature of the reg-
ulation resulted from its invalidation by the court.' 4
4
b. Judge Kozinski's Interpretation of First English
In his opinion dissenting from an order denying the petition for
rehearing en banc, Judge Kozinski incorrectly interpreted First English
to have held that a temporary regulatory taking that has deprived
landowners use of their property is a taking that must be compen-
sated. 145 He pointed to the language of the First English opinion that
137. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
303, 308, 311 (1987).
138. Id. at 311.
139. See id, at 321.
140. See id
141. See iL at 313.
142. See id at 321.
143. Id.
144. See id
145. See TSPC II, 228 F.3d 998, 1000 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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states: "[W] here the government's activities have already worked a tak-
ing of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government
can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period dur-
ing which the taking was effective." 146 Judge Kozinski apparently un-
derstood the Court to have held that a temporary regulation can be a
taking, despite its temporary nature. Following from his interpretation
of First English, Judge Kozinski found that the Ninth Circuit panel
"reverses First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Ange-
les .... and adopts Justice Stevens's First English dissent."147
Judge Kozinski opined that 'Justice Stevens would have held that
a temporary regulation cannot be a taking, even though it deprives
the owner of all present uses, because the property retains value based
upon its future uses."1 48 Putting Judge Kozinski's dissent aside for a
moment, it is important to comment on the fact that the majority
opinion in First English is not necessarily inconsistent with Justice Ste-
vens's argument against temporal severance. Since the present value
of property at any given moment is intertwined with the future value
of property, it is impossible to view the property in a vacuum. 49 The
majority in First English found that in the limited situation presented
there, where a permanent regulation was invalidated by the courts,
compensation must be made if the courts find a permanent regula-
tion constitutes a taking.1 50 Although the Court only addressed the
remedial stage, it is possible to infer that when one evaluates the time
period that the permanent regulation was in place, one is still able to
take the future value of the property into consideration and engage in
a legal fiction that the permanent regulation is still in place. 151 In the
situation of a temporary development moratorium, the future tells us
that the moratorium is temporary and therefore the future value of
the property is still intact, thus rendering First English inapplicable.
Whether this is temporal severance or not is another question taken
up in Part IV.B.
146. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting First English, 482 U.S. at 321).
147. Id. at 999 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 1000 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
149. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
150. See First English, 482 U.S. at 321.
151. See TSPC I, 216 F.3d 764, 778 (9th Cir. 2000). See also discussion infra Part IV.B.
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c. Judge Kozinski's Misplaced Reliance on the Federal Circuit
Judge Kozinski also pointed out Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States,152
which he claimed followed the majority's reasoning in First English.153
In Tabb Lakes, the plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their Fifth
Amendment takings claim.' 54 The plaintiffs claimed that the govern-
ment owed them compensation for a period of time when the United
States Army Corps of Engineers ("Army Corps") delayed residential
development on parts of the plaintiffs' property. 15 5 This delay resulted
because the property contained wetlands and in order to develop and
fill them, the plaintiffs had to obtain a permit from the Army
Corps. 156 The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim. 157 The
Federal Circuit reasoned that the cease and desist order, which
stopped the filling of the wetlands until the plaintiffs obtained a per-
mit from the Army Corps, was precisely the kind of governmental ac-
tion that does not constitute a taking. 158 Only when regulation goes
too far is it to be recognized as a taking.159 The regulation at issue in
Tabb Lakes did not go too far because it was just a preliminary step
taken toward obtaining a permit.'60
Interestingly, Judge Kozinski claimed that the Ninth Circuit's
opinion in TSPC I "creates a conflict with Tabb Lakes... ,which fol-
lowed the majority's reasoning in First English."161 He explained that,
[i] n so doing, Tabb Lakes recognized that "a taking, even for a day,
without compensation is prohibited by the Constitution." 162 Under
the panel's ruling in our case, a taking for a day could never require
compensation, because despite the temporary deprivation, the
property would retain almost all of its value based upon its ex-
pected future uses. 163
While Judge Kozinski is correct that Tabb Lakes may have followed
First English, he is incorrect that Tabb Lakes creates a conflict with TSPC
. The portion of the opinion Judge Kozinski quoted from Tabb Lakes,
152. 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
153. See TSPC II, 228 F.3d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinsi, J., dissenting).
154. See Tabb Lakes, Ltd., 10 F.3d at 798.
155. See id. at 799.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 804.
158. See id. at 800-01.
159. See id at 800.
160. See id. at 800-01.
161. TSPC II, 228 F.3d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
162. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting Tabb Lakes, Ltd., 10 F.3d at 800).
163. Id. (Kozinski, J. dissenting) (citations omitted).
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that "a taking, even for a day, without compensation is prohibited by
the Constitution,"164 is simply the court's recognition of the theoreti-
cal validity of the plaintiffs' claims. However, when a regulatory taking
is at issue the question is one of degree. A taking for a day requires
compensation only if the court had found that there was a taking for
that day. The words surrounding the portion of the opinion that
Judge Kozinski quoted are relevant to the meaning:
We agree in theory with plaintiff that a taking, even for a day, with-
out compensation is prohibited by the Constitution. However, the
question here is, "Was there a taking?" Or more specifically, "Did a
taking occur on [the date the cease and desist order took affect]?"
To answer that question, we must give the same effect to the cease
and desist order regardless of whether the order ultimately had a
permanent effect or only one limited in time.... Plaintiff is correct
that on October 8, 1986, the Corps' cease and desist order effec-
tively stopped its development of its property as it had planned.
However, plaintiff is incorrect that this interference or restriction
on the use of its land by government regulatory action necessarily
constituted a taking. 165
When put in this context, Judge Kozinski's comment that Tabb Lakes
conflicts with TSPC I does not make sense. Rather, TSPC I and Tabb
Lakes are completely consistent with each other.
The Tabb Lakes decision does not support conceptual severance.
The opinion quotes from a relevant portion of Penn Central, which
clearly states that
[t] aking jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a par-
ticular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court fo-
cuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature
and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a
whole.166
In fact, the Federal Circuit in Tabb Lakes chose not to engage in much
discussion regarding conceptual severance because of its finding that
"[e]ven if only [the parcels that the cease and desist order applied to]
are considered, the permit system brings the facts of this case within
the ambit of the holdings that preliminary regulatory activity does not
effect a taking in the constitutional sense." 167 It is interesting that
164. Tabb Lakes, Ltd., 10 F.3d at 800.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 802 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31
(1978)).
167. Id.
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Judge Kozinski chose to rely on a case that so clearly goes against his
stated opinion.
d. Loophole for the Government
One aspect of Judge Kozinski's opinion that should not be hastily
disregarded is the possible effect of a rule that exempts temporary
development moratoria from takings claims. He appropriately
pointed out that "[i]f local government can evade its constitutional
obligations by describing a regulation as 'temporary,' we create a siza-
ble loophole to the Takings Clause."1 68 This possibility of a loophole
should be considered when devising a rule regarding temporary devel-
opment moratoria. TSPC I presents this concern more strongly than
Tabb Lakes. TSPC I involves a series of regulations that have prohibited
the owner from developing for two decades, whereas in Tabb Lakes the
permitting process actually has the effect of leaving open the possibil-
ity of development, contingent on the permit being approved, while
maintaining the preservation of wetlands.
5. The United States Supreme Court Grants Certiorari
In June of 2001, the United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in TSPC.169 The Court limited its review to the following question:
"Whether the Court of Appeals properly determined that a temporary
moratorium on land development does not constitute a taking of
property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause of the
United States Constitution?"17 0 Although the question does not ex-
plicitly address the question of conceptual severance, this case will
provide an opportunity for the Supreme Court to clarify what the "rel-
evant parcel" is for purposes of determining whether there has been a
total taking.
B. Conceptual Severance and the Federal Circuit
Other circuits, particularly the Federal Circuit, give guidance in
developing a workable solution to the problem of whether the Court
should permit conceptual severance and the effect this would have on
regulations such as temporary development moratoria. The Federal
Circuit is a particularly good place to look to understand conceptual
168. TSPC II, 228 F.3d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
169. See TSPC III, 121 S. Ct. 2589 (2001) (oral arguments heard January 7, 2002) (the
Supreme Court issued its decision on April 23, 2002, as this Comment went to print, TSPC
III, No. 00-1167, slip op. (U.S. Apr. 23, 2002)).
170. Id. at 2589-90.
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severance because it hears more federal takings claims than any other
circuit. 171
The Federal Circuit has not employed conceptual severance out-
right. 172 In Tabb Lakes, the Federal Circuit did not conceptually sever
the plaintiffs' land in order to determine the relevant parcel of the
property. 173 Additionally, in Loveladies Harbors, Inc. v. United States,174
the court did not use conceptual severance to arrive at its holding that
a partial taking had not occurred. 175
III. Conceptual Severance and the Potential Conflict with
First English
Whether First English even addresses conceptual severance gener-
ally and temporal severance in particular is a highly contested issue.
This Comment argues that there are three ways of interpreting First
English's relationship to temporal severance: (1) First English is limited
to the remedial stage of takings analysis and is not relevant in any way
to determining whether a taking occurred; (2) First English is limited
to the remedial stage of takings analysis, but is relevant to the determi-
nation of whether there was a taking; and (3) First English is not lim-
ited to the remedial stage and held that a court may temporally sever
the property in order to determine whether there was a taking.
A. Is First English Limited to the Remedial Stage?
Implicit in the first two options above is the question of whether
First English is limited to the remedial stage of the takings analysis.
This Comment argues that it is limited to this stage because the Su-
preme Court very clearly limited its holding to the point when a tak-
ing has already been established. 176 The Court specifically stated that
171. The Federal Circuit was created in 1982, partially for the purpose of creating a
court with exclusive subject matter jurisdiction. See Courtney C. Tedrowe, Conceptual Sever-
ance and Takings in the Federal Circuit, 85 CORNELL L. Rv. 586, 588 n.13 (2000). One area
for which the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction is Fifth Amendment tak-
ings claims against the United States. See id. This has resulted in the Federal Circuit hear-
ing the majority of appeals from the district courts on federal takings claims. See id. In
addition to its exclusive subject matter jurisdiction, the geographic origin of a case is not
relevant to the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction over it. See id.
172. See generally id. at 602-25 (analyzing the relevant Federal Circuit cases that deal
with conceptual severance).
173. See Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 802 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
174. 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
175. See id. See also Tedrowe, supra note 171, at 614.
176. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 321 (1987).
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it was only dealing with the remedial stage of the takings analysis, 177
explaining, "[w]e merely hold that where the government's activities
have already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent ac-
tion by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensa-
tion for the period during which the taking was effective. 1 78 In
addition, the Court stated that the holding was limited to the facts of
the case presented. 179 This limitation is important because the facts of
First English involved a permanent regulation that was subsequently in-
validated. This situation is inherently different from a temporary regu-
lation, the very nature of which is the finite length of time the
regulation is in effect. This distinction is highlighted by the language
that follows the Court's limitation on the holding regarding "ob-
taining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances,
and the like .... 180 By distinguishing the facts of First English from
these situations, the Court, albeit unclearly, implies that its holding
only applies to the remedial stage. Whether this influences the exis-
tence of a taking-the first stage of the takings inquiry-is another
issue.
Interpreting First English to address the remedial stage, and not
the threshold question of establishing a taking, leaves open two op-
tions: (1) First English did not carve out the ability of the courts to
temporally sever property interests and this should not be permitted;
or (2) that implicit in addressing the remedies issue, the Court as-
sumed that the underlying substantive claim was valid.
B. Option One: First English Did Not Endorse Temporal Severance
The first option, that First English only addressed the remedial
stage and did not imply any acceptance of temporal severance, leaves
the Court to decide the issue of whether a temporary development
moratorium constitutes a taking independent of First English. In
adopting this interpretation, the Court must completely distinguish
the factual backgrounds of First English and TSPC. Simply because the
Court held in First English that the government must provide compen-
sation for the period of time that a permanent regulation deprived the
land owner of all economic benefit (even if the government later in-
validates the law), this does not mean that the government must pro-
vide compensation for the period of time that a temporary regulation
177. See id. at 311.
178. Id. at 321 (emphasis added).
179. See id.
180. Id
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was in place, unless that temporary regulation deprived the land
owner of all economic value of their land. This, however, would be an
unlikely situation, since the present and future values of land are
deeply intertwined.' 8
C. Option Two: First English Implicitly Endorsed Temporal
Severance
The second interpretation is that First English only addressed the
remedial stage, but that implicit within that, it accepted temporally
severing the land when determining the existence of a taking. By
holding that "no subsequent action by the government can relieve it
of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the
taking was effective,"182 the opinion implies that in determining
whether a taking occurred, there are times when the property must be
divided into time periods and looked at separately. As counsel for
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council suggested in his brief to the Su-
preme Court, "[s] urely, the Court would not have addressed the issue
in First English if it believed that the underlying substantive claim could
not result in a [Fifth] Amendment taking as a matter of law." 18 3
In addition, Justice Scalia pointed out in Lucas that if a regulation
deprives the owner of "all economically beneficial or productive uses
of land" the government must compensate. 184 He then stated in a
footnote that the government "may elect to rescind its regulation and
thereby avoid having to pay compensation for a permanent depriva-
tion."'185 He went on to quote Lucas's holding: "But 'where the [regu-
lation has] already worked a taking of all use of property, no
subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to pro-
vide compensation for the period during which the taking was effec-
tive."' 1 86 By putting these two statements in juxtaposition, Justice
Scalia implied that for purposes of a takings claim, the property may
be divided into periods of time. Whether this makes any difference in
the conclusion of whether there has been a taking is an entirely differ-
181. See generally Wade, supra note 86.
182. First English, 482 U.S. at 321.
183. Brief for Petitioner, Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council, at 29, TSPC III, 121 S. Ct.
2589 (2001) (No. 00-1167).
184. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992).
185. Id. at 1030 n.17. This implies that while the government may be liable for the
temporary deprivation, they can get out of paying the greater amount of compensation for
a permanent deprivation by electing to rescind the regulation at issue.
186. Id.
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ent matter which depends on the test used to determine whether a
taking has occurred.
D. Option Three: First English Explicitly Endorsed Temporal
Severance
The third option is to interpret First English's holding as endors-
ing temporal severance of property for purposes of determining the
threshold question of whether a total taking has occurred. This is a
stretch since the Court specifically limited its holding to a situation
where a taking had already been established. Even counsel for Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council admitted that the Court in First English
decided only the "remedy" question.18 7 Judge Kozinski, in his opinion
dissenting to the denial of rehearing en banc, is the only steadfast
adherent to this interpretation.
IV. Solution: The Supreme Court Should Reject Temporal
Severance
A. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council as an Opportunity to Address
Temporal Severance
The United States Supreme Court has not issued an opinion on
whether conceptual severance should be utilized in order to deter-
mine whether a taking of property occurred. Divergent opinions have
been offered on what should be inferred from the Court's prior opin-
ions that come close to answering this question. Since the Court has
granted certiorari on TSPC I (and TSPC I implicates the use of con-
ceptual severance), this case is the perfect opportunity for the Court
to establish a clear and precise rule regarding conceptual severance.
Should the Court look at the property as a whole to determine
whether there has been a total taking, or should it allow conceptual
severance of the property? One of the main issues the Court faces in
hearing TSPC I is the issue of temporal severance and the potential
conflicts between TSPC and First English. The ambiguous nature of
what constitutes a total regulatory taking makes it difficult to evenly
apply the categorical rules or ad hoc determinations involved in the
regulatory takings analysis. Whether a plaintiff has been denied all use
of her land hinges on whether the court looks at the land as a whole
or only at the piece of the land directly affected by the regulation. As
Justice Scalia pointed out in a footnote to Lucas, "this uncertainty re-
187. See Brief for Petitioner, Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council, at 29, TSPC II, 121 S.
Ct. 2589 (2001) (No. 00-1167).
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garding the composition of the denominator in our 'deprivation' frac-
tion has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court."'' 88
B. Temporal Severance Looks at Property in a Vacuum
This Comment argues that First English is clearly limited to the
remedial stage of a takings inquiry. However, it is not as clear what
effect, if any, that should have on the resolution of the first stage of a
takings claim. A good argument is that First English would not have
found a remedy for a substantive claim that would fail. It does not
necessarily follow that First English endorsed conceptual severance, or
that First English endorsed the kind of temporal severance that would
look at the property in a vacuum. The distinction between the regula-
tion in First English and the temporary development moratorium in
TSPC is that the former was permanent, while the latter temporary.
Allowing temporal severance and looking at the property in a vacuum
could have serious implications.
The future economic value of the property is relevant in deter-
mining whether the property owner has been deprived of all eco-
nomic value or use of her property (and thus, whether a taking has
occurred). When looking at the future value in First English during the
period of time that the permanent regulation was in effect, the future
economic value was probably minimal. This was so because the regula-
tion was intended to be permanent. 189 The regulation became tempo-
rary only because it was later invalidated. 190 Therefore, in First English,
the future economic value was determined by the permanence of the
regulation at the time the regulation was in place. This would likely
result in minimal future economic value. Even if the property is not
temporally severed and includes the time after the court invalidated
the regulation, the fact that during that point in time the property
owners were denied a significant right to economic use of their land
may serve as a factor leading to a finding of a taking.
On the other hand, when looking to the future value of land in
the case of a temporary development moratorium, the future indicates
that the moratorium will no longer be there and that the land still has
future economic value. Since the moratorium is temporary, the only
time the land is affected by it is the time that the moratorium is in
188. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-17 n.7 (1992).
189. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 307 (1987).
190. See generally id. at 312-13 (addressing the issue of the temporary nature of a tak-
ings claim).
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place. When looking at that period of time which is affected by the
moratoria, the future tells us the land will only temporarily be im-
pacted by the regulation. In this context, when determining whether
there is a taking under the Lucas categorical approach, one would
look to the present economic value of the land as well as the future
economic value of land. While the present economic value may be
minimal depending on the facts of the moratoria, the future value of
the land might be great. Temporally severing the property in this situ-
ation becomes impossible because the theory of conceptual severance
takes the property and pretends that the present is the only thing that
exists for that piece of property. It takes the future out of the equa-
tion. Allowing temporal severance for temporary development mora-
toria does not work unless the equation for determining the economic
value of the land no longer includes the future value. This would be
untenable since it is well established in property law that the future
value of land is relevant to the present value.
The United States Supreme Court should reject temporal sever-
ance in regulatory taking cases that are based on the Lucas categorical
rule. 19' This rule finds a taking if the landowner has been deprived of
all economically beneficial or productive use of her property. 192 In
order to determine the economic value of property, the future value is
relevant. 193 Therefore, temporal severance is not consistent with the
Lucas categorical rule. If the relevant parcel considered is the whole
piece of property and is not severed, that does not preclude a finding
of a taking in a situation such as TSPC or First English. The Lucas cate-
gorical approach becomes inappropriate in this situation. Other ap-
proaches, however, may be appropriate. 194 This merely makes it more
difficult to establish that there has been a taking requiring compensa-
tion. Since the standard is whether the regulation has gone "too far,"
as determined by various factors, 195 it is possible to find that a regula-
tion which only affects spatial or temporal portions of the property
has done just that-gone too far.
191. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
192. See id.
193. See Wade, supra note 86, at 289-99.
194. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001) (affirming the lower
court's conclusion that the owner was not deprived of all economic use of property, but
remanding for further evaluation under Penn Central's balancing test).
195. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, this Comment urges the Court to use TSPC as a
vehicle to clarify whether conceptual severance is permissible in deter-
mining whether there has been a taking. The Court can reject concep-
tual severance in general and temporal severance in particular
consistently with First English, because First English only dealt with the
remedial stage of a takings inquiry and is not applicable in terms of
conceptual severance. Rejecting conceptual severance does not mean
that a taking will never be established in situations where something
less than the whole property is impacted. Other factors may still estab-
lish a taking. The future economic value of land is intertwined with
the present value. Thus, temporal severance wrongly views property in
a vacuum, ignoring future use of the property when determining
whether there was a compensable taking.
